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Abstract In theory, intuitive decisions are made immediately,
without conscious, reasoned thought. They are experienced as
decisions based on hunches that cannot be explicitly described
but, nevertheless, guide subsequent action. Investigating the
underlying neural mechanisms, previous research has found
the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) to be crucial to intuitive pro-
cesses, but its specific role has remained unclear. On the basis
of a two-stage conceptualization of intuition suggested by
Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, and Parker Cognitive
Psychology, 22, 72-110 (1990), we attempt to clarify the
OFC’s role in intuitive processing. We propose that it func-
tions as an early integrator of incomplete stimulus input guid-
ing subsequent processing bymeans of a coarse representation
of the gist of the information. On the subjective level, this
representation would be perceived as a (gut) feeling biasing
the decision. Our aim in the present study was to test this
neural model and rule out alternative explanations of OFC
activation in intuitive judgments. We used magnetoencepha-
lography (MEG) to record participants' electromagnetic brain
responses during a visual coherence judgment task. As in
earlier studies, the OFC was found to be activated when
participants perceived coherence. Using MEG, it could be
shown that this increase in activation began earlier in the
OFC than in temporal object recognition areas. Moreover,
the present study demonstrated that OFC activation was inde-
pendent of physical stimulus characteristics, task require-
ments, and participants’ explicit recognition of the stimuli
presented. These results speak to the OFC’s fundamental role
in the early steps of intuitive judgments and suggest the
proposed neural model as a promising starting point for future
investigations.
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Introduction
In everyday life, people commonly have to decide quickly
between multiple alternatives, the potential consequences of
which are often unpredictable. Thus everyday-life decisions
are often made on the basis of incomplete stimulus informa-
tion, and usually within time limitations. Such “decisions
under uncertainty” stand in contrast to so-called “decisions
under risk,” in which all possible alternatives and outcomes,
as well as their probabilities, are known (Knight, 1921). In
order to deal with decisions under uncertainty in real-life
situations, an individual needs to have rapid judgmental abil-
ities that do not depend on a conscious thought process
moving through all the steps of reasoning. These kinds of
rapid judgments have been termed intuitive (e.g., Evans, 2008;
Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011).
An empirically fruitful working definition for intuitive
processes has been put forward by Bowers, Regehr,
Balthazard, and Parker (1990), who conceive of intuition as
a preliminary perception of coherence that guides further
thought and action toward a hypothesis on the nature of the
coherence in question. This framework suggests that intuition
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is a continuous process of accumulating clues of coherence
from incomplete stimulus input. This accumulation, in turn,
activates related mnemonic networks. In a first stage, which
Bowers and colleagues termed the guiding stage, the accumu-
lation of clues of coherence eventually leads to a feeling of
coherence. The feeling of coherence is already strong enough
to trigger subsequent decision and action, despite the fact that,
in the guiding stage, it is not—or not yet—possible to explic-
itly report what makes the stimulus coherent. Decisions based
on such initial feelings of coherence are termed intuitive. In a
second stage, called the integrative stage, cues are further
accumulated, and the initial hunch of coherence evolves into
an explicit representation. This explicit representation “occurs
when sufficient activation has accumulated to cross a thresh-
old of awareness” (Bowers et al., 1990, p. 74), thereby making
it possible for the individual to consciously reason out the
decision made or action taken in the guiding stage.
Bowers and colleagues (1990) created several paradigms to
investigate intuition in the context of coherence judgments. In
the present study, we used a paradigm based on their Waterloo
Gestalt closure task (WGCT) in order to operationalize intu-
itive processes in the domain of visual detection. In the
WGCT, participants have to judge the coherence of incom-
plete line drawings that are either fragmented or scrambled.
For fragmented line drawings, a certain amount of pixel
information (randomly spread across the entire stimulus) is
taken away, making the recognition of the originally displayed
object more difficult but not impossible. In scrambled line
drawings, the pixel information of the resulting fragments are,
on top of that, randomly mixed up, which makes the original
displayed object unrecognizable. Studies applying WGCT-
like paradigms (Bolte & Goschke, 2008; Bowers et al.,
1990; Luu et al., 2010; Topolinski & Strack, 2009; Volz &
von Cramon, 2006) have revealed that participants discrimi-
nate between fragmented and scrambled line drawings over
chance; that is, they are significantly more likely to rate
fragmented than scrambled line drawings as coherent. This
is true even for those coherence judgments after which partic-
ipants cannot explicitly name the objects displayed but solely
report having had a “feeling of coherence.” Such findings
support the existence of a guiding stage, in which an initial
intuitive feeling of coherence is strong enough to trigger a
judgment, even if its basis cannot yet be explicitly reported.
Different neural regions and networks have been suggested
to be related to intuitive processing. Satpute and Lieberman
(2009), for example, reviewed such literature and, on its basis,
proposed a broad neurocognitive model. Regarding research
on intuitive judgments related to an initial perception of co-
herence, however, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) sticks out as
a crucial structure. In a study combining magnetoencephalog-
raphy (MEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), Bar et al. (2006) found the OFC to be involved in
the early stages of object recognition. Presenting their
participants with hard-to-recognize drawings of nameable
objects, they found that OFC activation early after stimulus
onset is linked to participants' recognition performance. Fur-
thermore, they found a higher OFC activation for stimuli with
low spatial frequency (LSF), in contrast to activation for
stimuli with high spatial frequency. LSFs represent the global
information about the shape, such as general orientation and
proportions, and thus this representation can be thought of as
reflecting mostly the gist of the information. On the basis of
their results, the authors have suggested that the OFC serves as
an initial integrator of incomplete stimulus information and
facilitates object recognition by encoding an initial coarse
representation containing solely the gist or core idea of the
percept. In a top-down process, such a coarse representation
may then be signaled onward to structures enabling actions, as
well as further, more detailed processing. This conceptualiza-
tion fits in very well with Bowers et al.’s (1990) framework of
intuition, and in the present study, we use it as a preliminary
neural model for intuitive processing, as displayed in Fig. 1.
The coarse representation hypothesized to evolve in the
OFC would then, on a subjective level, be experienced as an
initial hunch or gut feeling that can trigger a coherence judg-
ment, even if the basis of coherence cannot yet be explicitly
reported. Studies specifically investigating the neural basis of
intuitive processing using WGCT-like paradigms underline
such an essential role of the OFC. In one fMRI study, Volz
and von Cramon (2006) found activation in the left OFC for
the contrast between incomplete stimuli rated as coherent and
those rated as incoherent. The authors showed that this acti-
vation increase is a function of the probability of a preliminary
perception of coherence. Furthermore, the OFC’s role as a
detector and predictor of potential content has been suggested
to be domain independent, since OFC activation has also been
observed for coherence judgments in a WGCT-like task
adapted to the auditory domain (Volz, Rübsamen, & von
Cramon, 2008). Further supporting evidence for the OFC’s
involvement in the representation and top-down processing of
gist or meaning has been reported by Luu and colleagues
(2010), who used a WGCT-like task with electroencephalog-
raphy and found that reentrant OFC activation was linked to
the judgment of fragmented line drawings as coherent.
The above-mentioned studies provide strong evidence for
assuming that the OFC is in some way involved in intuitive
judgments of coherence—that is, when the detection of mean-
ing is difficult to grasp and no other, more unambiguous
features can be used to help. However, it remains unclear
exactly what the role of the OFC is in such judgments. The
present study approached this question by testing the plausi-
bility of interpreting OFC activation for intuitive judgments in
the framework of the described two-stage model of intuition.
Thus, the core research question was: Is it empirically plausi-
ble to interpret OFC activation in a WGCT-like task as
reflecting the initial intuitive perception of coherence that
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precedes later stimulus processing geared toward a more
explicit understanding?
For this question to be answered in the affirmative, the
following five conditions concerning the OFC activation re-
corded in the present study must be met. (1) To replicate
former results and form the basis of the proposed model, an
increased OFC activation must appear when participants per-
ceive coherence—that is, when stimuli are judged as coherent
(subsequently referred to as coherent stimuli), but not when
stimuli are judged as incoherent (subsequently referred to as
incoherent stimuli). (2) As suggested by the results of Bar and
colleagues’ (2006) research, but until now not seen in a
coherence judgment task, this differential increase in OFC
activation must be temporally observed before a differentia-
tion in object recognition areas occurs. Only if condition 2
holds true can one assume that OFC activation reflects an
intuitive perception of coherence that, temporally, comes be-
fore explicit object recognition. (3) In accordance with Volz
and von Cramon’s (2006) results, a significant OFC activation
difference must not appear between the different stimulus
types as determined objectively (i.e., fragmented and scram-
bled stimuli). In the performance-dependent contrast (coher-
ent vs. incoherent), we collapse over objective stimulus cate-
gories (fragmented and scrambled), aiming to disentangle
neural correlates specifically linked to the subjective feeling
of coherence. Condition 3 therefore is necessary to remove the
concern that OFC activation found for the perception of
coherence may be confounded with physical stimulus charac-
teristics—that is, explicable via differential aspects of the two
stimulus types that are unrelated to the subjective coherence
judgment. (4) A significant OFC activation difference must
not be found between scrambled stimuli in experimental ver-
sus control trials, with the latter differing only in the preceding
task instructions. The control trials, introduced in the present
study next to the experimental trials, were marked by a red
fixation cross displayed in advance of the stimulus. The red
fixation cross indicated that a stimulus did not display a
meaningful object and, thus, that no judgment had to be made.
Condition 4 is necessary to ensure that OFC activation is not
prompted by a participant’s intention—in other words, a par-
ticipant’s serious attempt to recognize coherence in the line
drawings. Such attempts might be assumed to bias participants
to judge stimuli as coherent and therefore, like physical stim-
ulus characteristics, influence the contrast between subjective-
ly coherent and incoherent stimuli. However, for control trials,
they are completely absent. (5) A final but crucial point that
has also not been considered in previous studies is that the
differential in OFC activation between subjectively coherent
Fig. 1 Preliminary neural model of intuitive processing. As proposed by
Bar et al. (2006), the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) functions as an integrator
of stimulus input and processes this input toward a coarse representation
or gist. We suggest that this coarse representation is, on a subjective level,
reflected by an initial hunch or gut feeling that biases judgment and
further stimulus analysis. Note that this does not exclude a parallel route
directly linking early sensory areas with such responsible for a more
detailed analysis (e.g., Plailly, Howard, Gitelman, & Gottfried, 2008).
This route however will not be further addressed in the present article
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and incoherent stimuli should not depend solely on conscious
object recognition. According to Bowers and colleagues’
(1990) model, it is assumed that conscious object recognition
is always preceded by a guiding stage—that is, the stage of
intuitive processing. If this is correct, time courses of activa-
tion in regions related to intuitive processing should be found
to be very similar for stimuli for which an object name is given
(subsequently referred to as explicitly coherent stimuli) and
those for which the object cannot be named (subsequently
referred to as implicitly coherent stimuli). Certainly, to dem-
onstrate that activation in a region is actually representing
intuitive processing stages, it is important to show that this
activation cannot only be found when implicitly and explicitly
coherent stimuli are taken together, but also when explicitly
recognized stimuli are not included in the contrast. Proposing
the OFC to be involved particularly in the intuitive aspects of
stimulus processing, we therefore expect to find no signifi-
cantly differential activation in the contrast between implicitly
and explicitly coherent stimuli. More important, there must be
a significant difference in activation of implicitly coherent
versus incoherent stimuli. This condition is necessary to rule
out the possibility that the OFC may play a role only in
explicit recognition, rather than in the early intuitive percep-
tion of coherence. Whether these five conditions in support of
the proposed model were met was tested with a modified
version of the WGCT. MEG was used to record brain activa-
tion, because of its high temporal resolution, which is neces-




Twenty-four healthy students (10 males) from the University
of Tübingen (age range, 18–29; age mean, 23.583 ± 2.9915)
completed the experiment for a payment of 12 Euros per hour.
All participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, and spoke German as their native language.
None had irremovable metal implants in their bodies. The
experimental procedure and data collection followed the eth-
ical guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki (revised version,
2012) and were approved by the local ethical committee of the
University of Tübingen Medical Department.
Stimuli and experimental paradigm
Stimuli were taken from the database of Snodgrass figures
(Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980), which contains a large
number of line drawings displaying nameable objects. From
those, the stimuli were created as described in Volz and von
Cramon (2006). That is, fragmented stimuli were created by
removing pixel information via a filter so that the original
objects became fairly difficult to recognize. Three levels of
fragmentation were defined according to three filters differing
in their capacity to mask the object. Scrambled stimuli were
created by dividing the fragmented stimuli into eight equally
sized parts and randomly mixing those up, so that no mean-
ingful form was left. This procedure ensured that fragmented
and scrambled line drawings had exactly the same pixel
information and differed only in their higher-order meaning
(i.e., their global gestalt). For an example of fragmented and
scrambled stimuli and the levels of fragmentation, please see
Fig. 2a.
The paradigm used was a modified version of Bowers and
colleagues' (1990) WGCT. It was programmed with Presen-
tation® Version 14.8 (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). A
timeline for an experimental trial is given in Fig. 2b. On every
trial, a line drawing was presented for 500 ms. Subsequently,
each participant had 2 s to decide via a buttonpress whether or
not the presented line drawing showed a nameable object—
that is, whether the stimulus was coherent or incoherent. If
participants judged a line drawing as coherent, they had an-
other 2 s to indicate via a buttonpress whether they could
actually name the object. Participants were told in the instruc-
tions that they would be shown the line drawings they claimed
to be able to name (i.e., the explicitly coherent line drawings)
again after the experimental session (i.e., outside the MEG).
They were also made aware that they would have to write
down, in one word, what they thought each of them depicted.
Analyzing only the explicitly coherent line drawings, 90.6%
(±10.47%) belonged to the objective class of fragmented
stimuli, and among these explicitly coherent and fragmented
drawings, participants could, outside the MEG, give the cor-
rect name or a synonym in 93.08% (±9.09%) of the cases.
This link between subjective perception and objective correct-
ness gave us the confidence to assume that participants’
assessment of whether they are able to name a line drawing
is based on an actual explicit concept of the object displayed.
Note, however, that also the few scrambled line drawings (i.e.,
those without an objectively correct solution) that were judged
as coherent and nameable (median number over participants =
5) were included in the analysis as explicitly coherent stimuli.
The same was true for fragmented line drawings that were
given a name not reflecting their objectively correct solution.
This is because our focus was on the subjective perception of
coherence, which does not necessarily need to be equivalent to
objective correctness.
Each participant had tomake a coherence judgment for 150
fragmented and 75 scrambled line drawings. The levels of
fragmentation were distributed equally (50 fragmented stimuli
and 25 scrambled stimuli for each level of fragmentation), and
all stimuli were fully randomized in sequence. In addition to
these 225 experimental trials, there were 60 control trials. The
occasional change of task requirements was implemented to
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control for brain activation involved in basal stimulus pro-
cessing that is elicited purely from looking at the stimulus
without the intention to recognize coherence. Control trials
were indicated by a red fixation cross. Subsequently, partici-
pants were presented with a control stimulus that always
resembled a scrambled line drawing. They received the in-
struction that line drawings after a red fixation cross would
never show a nameable object, so that no attempt at making a
judgment had to be made. However, they were asked to pay as
much attention to stimuli on control trials as to stimuli on
experimental trials. After the scrambled line drawing in a
control trial vanished, participants simply had to press one
of the two response buttons. A timeline for a control trial is
given in Fig. 2c.
Experimental procedure and recording
The study was conducted at the MEGCenter of the University
of Tübingen. Participants were seated on a height-adjustable
chair inside a magnetically shielded room (Vakuumschmelze,
Hanau, Germany). Neuromagnetic recordings were obtained
via a 275-sensor, whole-head MEG system (VSM Medtech,
Port Coquitlam, Canada). Visual stimuli were projected, using
a standard video projector, onto a screen in the recording room
that was placed about 60 cm away from the participants.
Participants read the instructions immediately before the
beginning of the task, and everyone was asked to repeat the
instructions aloud in order for us to determine whether they
had been understood. The experimental paradigm took about
half an hour. The task began with a training sequence of 12
trials. When participants stated that they understood the task
and had no further questions, the experimental blocks started.
Participants had to work on 285 trials in five blocks containing
57 trials each. Between blocks, they could take a break, the
duration of which they themselves determined. For each indi-
vidual participant, the 285 presented line drawings were fully
randomized in sequence.
The MEG signal was recorded continuously, with a sam-
pling rate of 585.938 Hz. Participants’ head position with
respect to sensor positions was measured for every block,
and care was taken that head movement remained lower than
5 mm. To ensure that the timing of the measurement was not
influenced by the slight delay between the presentation on the
computer screen and the projection, each event (i.e., fixation
cross, line drawing, answer screen 1, answer screen 2) was
encoded via white rectangles in the right corner of the screen.
The rectangles were not visible to the participant but were
recorded via photo-diodes. Those recordings were later used
to determine the exact onset times of events. In addition,
participants' responses (coherent/solved = explicitly coherent,
coherent/unsolved = implicitly coherent, or incoherent), the
Fig. 2 a Example of stimuli: fragmented (above) and scrambled (below)
line drawings, in three steps of difficulty, from left (lowest level of
fragmentation) to right (highest level of fragmentation). Nameable object
displayed in the fragmented line drawings is a traffic light; the scrambled
line drawings are mixed up versions of the fragmented ones, no traffic
light can be recognized anymore. b Timeline of an experimental trial.
From left to right: (1) fixation cross, (2) stimulus presentation, (3) coher-
ence judgment screen (I = incoherent, C = coherent), (4) solution
judgment screen (SW = solution word, nSW = no solution word). Note,
that the solution judgment screen appeared only when participants judged
a stimulus as coherent. The boxes under the possible answers served as
feedback for the participants. When they changed color from white to
blue, this indicated that the participant's answer had been recorded. c
Timeline of a control trial. From left to right: (1) fixation cross, (2)
stimulus presentation, (3) buttonpress without decision. The red fixation
cross served as an indicator for control trials
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sequence of stimulus types (fragmented, scrambled, control),
and the according level of difficulty (1, 2, or 3) were recorded
by the MEG system via digital triggers.
MEG analysis
MEG data were analyzed with MATLAB 7.14 (The
MathWorks, Natick, MA) and the MATLAB-based software
packages Fieldtrip (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen,
2011) and Brainstorm (Tadel, Baillet, Mosher, Pantazis, &
Leahy, 2011). The Fieldtrip software was used for preprocess-
ing and time-locked averaging over epochs on the sensor
level. For preprocessing, the continuous recordings of each
block were segmented into epochs of 1.5 s, reaching from
1.000 ms before stimulus onset to 500 ms after stimulus onset,
with 200 ms before stimulus onset used for baseline correc-
tion. The poststimulus time span encompassed the exact time
span during which the line drawings were presented and,
therefore, excluded possible confounding of the
neuromagnetic responses with the subsequent motor response
of buttonpressing. For each block, sensors containing mag-
netic artifacts (±1 pT) were removed and interpolated; that is,
they were replaced by the average of their neighboring sen-
sors. No more than six sensors had to be interpolated in any
block. Subsequently, epochs were rejected if they contained
magnetic artifacts (±1 pT). No more than 10% of epochs in
any of the conditions had to be rejected for any participant.
Each participant’s epochs were averaged time-locked to stim-
ulus onset, separately for the conditions of interest (cf. the
Results section). The same number of epochs was used for the
average of conditions that were planned to be tested against
each other (i.e., [1] participants' responses and [2] stimulus
types), to make sure that those conditions did not systemati-
cally differ in noise level.
On the basis of the time-locked averages, source activation
was estimated using the depth-weighted minimum L2 norm
estimator of cortical current density (for a detailed description,
see Hämäläinen & Ilmoniemi, 1994) as implemented in the
Brainstorm software. The source estimation was normalized
using the noise covariance matrix (as described by Dale et al.,
2000) calculated separately for each participant, over all con-
ditions, from the 1-s prestimulus time span. The underlying
forward model was computed using the method of overlap-
ping spheres as described by Huang, Mosher, and Leahy
(1999). Given that no individual anatomies from magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) data were available, the forward
model was based on the MNI/Colin27 template that is used in
the Brainstorm software. The template was warped to fit a set
of each participant’s digitized individual head points. For
technical details, see Leahy, Mosher, Spencer, Huang, and
Lewine (1998).
Differences in source activation between (1) participants'
responses and (2) stimulus types were tested via repeated
measurement t-tests under a significance level of .01. Cluster
size and length of time spans served to correct for multiple
comparisons. That is, in a first step, differential activation in
each vertex on source level averaged over the entire stimulus
time span (0–500 ms) was tested for the different stimulus
contrasts. To correct for multiple comparisons, only clusters
with a p-value less than .01 for more than 20 adjacent vertices
are reported as significant. In a second step, the mean activa-
tion over all vertices of a cluster was used to calculate running
t-tests at each point in time (each sampling point). Again to
correct for multiple comparisons, only time spans with a p-
value less than .01 for more than 24 consecutive sampling




The behavioral analysis served to make sure that participants
were able to—above chance—tell the difference between
fragmented and scrambled stimuli and to replicate the finding
that the latter was true, even without them being able to
explicitly name the objects judged as coherent. In total, par-
ticipants rated 52.66% (±12.00 percentage points [pp]) of all
line drawings (i.e., fragmented as well as scrambled ones) as
coherent and claimed to be able to name 27.12% (±10.34 pp)
of them. An overview of participants’mean responses (coher-
ent/incoherent) for the different stimulus types and steps of
difficulty is given in Table 1. Applying a signal detection
framework, fragmented stimuli rated as coherent are consid-
ered hits, given that those stimuli still contain a nameable
object to be detected. In contrast, scrambled stimuli rated as
coherent are considered false alarms. See Table 2 for an
overview over all stimulus types and response alternatives,
as well as their interpretation in the signal detection frame-
work. Among fragmented line drawings, the mean percentage
of hits was 62.04% (±11.662 pp). The mean percentage of
false alarms among scrambled line drawings was 34.01%
(±14.419 pp). The parameters d′ and C were calculated ac-
cording to signal detection theory (see Abdi, 2007). The
parameter d′, defined as the difference between the z-standard-
ized hit and false alarm rates, was used as a measurement for
task difficulty (ranging from 0, which represents chance per-
formance, to infinity, with values higher than 4 representing
nearly perfect performance). The parameter C, defined as the
mean of the z-standardized hit and false alarm rates, served to
represent response bias (ranging from −1 to 1, with 0
representing unbiased response behavior). The mean d′ calcu-
lated for the present task was 0.775 (±0.259, p against zero <
.001), which reflects a fairly difficult task, with the difference
between signal and noise distribution being slightly lower
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than one standard deviation of the z-statistic (i.e., 1). Themean
criterion C was 0.064 (±0.350, p against zero = .390), which
reflects an unbiased response strategy.
To check whether participants were able to discriminate
between fragmented and scrambled stimuli without explicitly
knowing the basis of their discrimination, the difference be-
tween hits and false alarms was calculated once again, but
after removing explicitly coherent trials. The resulting value
has been termed the intuition index (Bolte, Goschke, & Kuhl,
2003). In the present study, the percentage of hits neglecting
explicitly coherent stimuli was 40.73% (±16.370 pp), and the
corresponding percentage of false alarms was 26.84%
(±15.388 pp). The intuition index was therefore 13.89%
(±7.51 pp), which is significantly over the chance level of
zero, t(23) = 9.054, p < .001.
Mean reaction times of the coherence judgments for the
different stimulus types and responses are given in Table 3. A
2 × 3 ANOVAwas conducted, with factor one being stimulus
type (i.e., fragmented or scrambled line drawings) and factor
two being response (i.e., explicitly coherent [judged as coher-
ent and able to name], implicitly coherent [judged as coherent
and not able to name], or incoherent [judged as incoherent]
stimuli. A significant main effect was revealed of stimulus
type, F(1, 20) = 11.081, p = .003, with fragmented stimuli
being decided upon more quickly than scrambled ones. Also,
the main effect of response reached significance, F(2, 40) =
15.256, p < .001, with post hoc tests showing that explicitly
coherent stimuli were decided upon more quickly than inco-
herent stimuli, F(1, 20) = 14.165, p = .001, as well as more
quickly than implicitly coherent stimuli, F(1, 20) = 39.168,
p < .001. A significant interaction effect between the two main
factors,F(2, 40) = 10.231, p < .001, reflected the tendency that
in a signal detection framework, correct answers (hits and
correct rejections) were given more quickly than incorrect
ones (misses and false alarms).
Altogether, the response pattern and the reaction times
indicate that participants processed fragmented stimuli in a
different way than they processed scrambled ones and were
able to discriminate between them even if they could not
explicitly report what this discrimination was based on.
MEG results
TheMEG analysis focused on the five conditions set up to test
the plausibility of the proposed neural model of intuitive
processing—that is, the notion of the OFC functioning as an
early integrator of incomplete stimulus information.
Condition 1 was the basic assumption of stimuli judged as
coherent eliciting a higher response in the OFC than stimuli
judged as incoherent. Therefore, a performance-dependent
contrast (coherent, collapsing explicitly and implicitly coher-
ent vs. incoherent) of MEG activation projected on the source
level was calculated for all brain vertices. Six clusters of more
than 20 adjacent vertices differing significantly (p < .01)
between coherent and incoherent stimuli were found, as
displayed in Fig. 3. In all of the six clusters, the mean of
absolute activation over the entire stimulus time span (500ms)
was higher for coherent stimuli. Clusters were located in (1)
the left orbitofrontal cortex, (2) the left inferior frontal gyrus,
(3) the left inferior temporal/fusiform gyrus, (4) the left middle
temporal gyrus, (5) the right middle/superior frontal gyrus,
and (6) the right occipital cortex.
Table 1 Mean percentage of
responses (±SD) for the different
stimulus categories and steps of
difficulty (step 1: most pixel
information present, easiest; step
3: least pixel information present,
most difficult)
Stimulus Type Difficulty Response
Coherent (Explicit or Implicit) Incoherent
Fragmented step1 81.38 (±10.261) 17.83 (±10.343)
step2 55.41 (±14.871) 43.95 (±14.466)
step3 48.99 (±14.572) 50.29 (±14.064)
Scrambled step1 51.24 (±22.261) 51.27 (±18.976)
step2 14.44 (±6.405) 70.73 (±12.706)
step3 13.41 (±8.372) 73.45 (±17.509)
Table 2 Overview over all possible combinations of stimulus types and responses, as well as their interpretation in a signal detection framework
Response
Explicitly Coherent Implicitly Coherent Incoherent
Stimulus Type Fragmented hit (object name provided) hit (no object name provided) miss
Scrambled false alarm (object name provided) false alarm (no object name provided) correct rejection
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To get an insight into the temporal characteristics of acti-
vation and to test condition 2—that is, the OFC activated
earlier than object recognition areas—the time courses over
stimulus presentation were extracted for all activated clusters.
The MNI coordinates, size, and significant time spans (p <
.01 at every sampling point for more than 40 ms) can be seen
in Table 4. Most notably, the time course of the left OFC
showed an early significant differentiation starting at 174 ms
after stimulus onset and lasting for 70 ms. A second differen-
tiation from 271ms after stimulus onset till the end of stimulus
presentation was found as well. The differentiation at the left
inferior temporal/fusiform gyrus was also significant for two
time spans, with the first one starting 43 ms later than in the
OFC, and the second one starting more than 100 ms later. The
time courses for the OFC and the inferior temporal gyrus are
shown in Fig. 4a, b. The differentiation in the left inferior
frontal gyrus began at 183 ms—that is, later than it did in the
OFC, but earlier than it did in the inferior temporal gyrus. The
left middle temporal gyrus began differing only at a late time
span of 343 ms after stimulus onset and until the end of
stimulus presentation. The results presented so far are there-
fore in accordance with conditions 1 and 2—that is, (1) a
substantial involvement of the OFC in the perception of
coherence and (2) an early involvement with the OFC being
considered to integrate initial stimulus information and signal
them onward to further processing areas.
The purpose of testing conditions 3 and 4—that is, no signif-
icant OFC activation differences between fragmented versus
scrambled, as well as scrambled versus control, stimuli—was
to ensure that OFC activation is specific to the subjective coher-
ence judgments and does not depend on stimulus characteristics
or task requirements that might be confounded with the subjec-
tive judgment. Therefore, two stimulus-dependent contrasts
(fragmented vs. scrambled stimuli and scrambled vs. control
stimuli) were investigated. In the stimulus-dependent contrasts.
fragmented and scrambled stimuli were collapsed over responses
(explicitly coherent, implicitly coherent, or incoherent), so that
only the difference between objective stimulus characteristics (3)
and task requirements (4) could be investigated and separated
from correlates of the subjective feeling of coherence as tested in
(1), (2), and (5). No activated cluster could be found anywhere in
the orbitofrontal cortex for either of the stimulus-dependent
contrasts. Additionally, in extracting time courses for the left
OFC cluster as taken from the performance-dependent contrast,
there was no significantly different time span for the stimulus-
dependent contrasts. The time courses are displayed in Fig. 5a.
Conditions 3 and 4 are therewith fulfilled as well, ruling out a
stimulus-dependent explanation of OFC activation.
The last condition (5)—that is, increased OFC activation for
solely implicitly coherent stimuli—was tested to ensure that the
OFC activation found in the contrast between coherent stimuli
(collapsed over implicitly and explicitly coherent) and incoherent
stimuli does not solely represent explicit object recognition. First
of all, contrasting implicitly and explicitly coherent stimuli for
the left OFC cluster (taken from the overall performance-
dependent contrast of all coherent vs. incoherent stimuli), no
significantly different time span could be found. Furthermore,
investigating implicitly and explicitly coherent stimuli separately
for this cluster, differential activation, as compared with incoher-
ent stimuli, was still present. Between 269 and 406 ms after
stimulus onset, as well as 408 and 500 ms after stimulus onset,
activation was significantly higher for implicitly coherent stimuli
Table 3 Mean reaction times
(milliseconds after response time
onset, ±SD) for the different
stimulus categories and response
types
Stimulus Type Response
Explicitly Coherent Implicitly Coherent Incoherent
Fragmented 456.83 (±109.951) 661.53 (±171.082) 660.971 (±169.828)
Scrambled 562.13 (±179.710) 731.26 (±236.822) 616.701 (±165.179)
Fig. 3 Activated clusters in the
performance-dependent contrast.
All clusters larger than 20 vertices
with significantly (p < .01) higher
activation (for coherent stimuli, as
opposed to incoherent stimuli) are
shown
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than it was for incoherent stimuli. A differencewas also observed
for explicitly coherent stimuli in contrast to incoherent ones,
although only between 297 and 416 ms after stimulus onset.
The time courses of OFC activation in implicitly coherent and
explicitly coherent, as contrasted to incoherent, stimuli can be
looked up in Fig. 5b. These results fulfill condition 5, ruling out
the possibility that OFC activation is explainable via explicit
object recognition.
Discussion
Study summary and purpose
The present study endeavored to clarify the particular involve-
ment of the OFC in intuitive judgmental processes. Participants
were presented with line drawings of either fragmented but still
nameable objects or their scrambled counterparts and had to
decide for each stimulus whether they believed it was nameable
and, if so, whether they could actually name it. Behavioral results
in several previous studies of this kind (e.g., Bowers et al., 1990;
Luu et al., 2010; Volz & von Cramon, 2006), as well as those in
the present study, revealed that participants were able to discrim-
inate above chance between fragmented and scrambled stimuli.
Most important, this result also held true when participants stated
that they were not able to name the object, which supports the
assertion that the present task involves intuitive coherence judg-
ments as defined by Bowers et al. Such intuitive coherence
judgments are based on a preliminary hunch arrived at without
the actual nature of the coherence in question being reportable, at
least at the time of judgment.
Participants’ neuromagnetic responses were recorded with
MEG, which, because of its high temporal resolution, is ideal
for investigating the temporal dynamics crucial to clarifying
the role of OFC activation in intuitive judgments. The pro-
posed preliminary neural model of intuitive coherence judg-
ments, as suggested by Bar and colleagues (2006), conceives
of the OFC as an integrator of incomplete stimulus input that
signals a first coarse representation of the information forward
to further processing areas.We suggest, in line with the idea of
Bowers and colleagues (1990), that this coarse representation
is experienced, on a subjective level, as an early feeling of
coherence that can trigger subsequent judgment and action,
even before a full evaluation of the stimulus leads to explicit
knowledge of the basis of coherence. If this proposed neural
model holds true, OFC activation in the coherence judgment
task should then be directly linked to an intuitive feeling of
coherence. Earlier results have already provided evidence for
the OFC’s involvement in visual coherence judgments (Luu
et al., 2010; Volz & von Cramon, 2006). In order for the
proposed neural model of the OFC to be valid, certain condi-
tions must hold. (1) OFC activation must increase for stimuli
that elicit an intuitive feeling of coherence. (2) The differen-
tiation between subjectively coherent and incoherent stimuli
must start earlier in the OFC than in object recognition areas.
(3) The differential OFC activation may not be explainable via
Table 4 List of clusters in the performance-dependent contrast: anatom-
ical specifications, MNI coordinates, number of vertices, and significant
time spans (milliseconds after stimulus onset) displayed for clusters with
higher activation for coherent stimuli than for incoherent stimuli over the
mean of stimulus presentation (0–500 ms)





Left orbitofrontal cortex −30 43 −13 75
174–249
270–500
Left inferior frontal gyrus −46 16 −12 64
183–232
307–500
Left inferior temporal gyrus −56 −29 −18 88
217–260
382–454
Left middle temporal gyrus −64 −3 −17 59 343–500
Right middle/superior frontal gyrus 29 13 60 74
125–183
304–357
Right lateral occipital cortex 48 −73 36 56
193–302
384–500
Note. All clusters significant over the mean of 0–500 ms with p < .01 for more than 20 adjacent vertices are listed. All time spans significant with p < .01
for each sampling point in more than 40 ms, as well as the mean of the given time span, are listed for each cluster.
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physical stimulus characteristics; that is, there shall be noOFC
activation difference between objective stimulus categories.
(4) It shall also not be explainable via task requirements; that
is, scrambled and control stimuli where no judgment has to be
Fig. 4 a Time courses for the performance-dependent contrast (coherent
and incoherent stimuli) in the orbitofrontal cortex. Coordinates x, y, and z
indicate the MNI coordinates at the maximal point of differential activa-
tion of each cluster. Plotted is the mean of absolute activation over the
entire cluster from −200 to 500 ms (with zero being stimulus onset). The
blue line signifies coherent trials, the red line incoherent trials; both are
surrounded by their standard errors at each point. Time spans significant
in repeated measurement t-tests (with p < .01 for more than 40 ms) are
marked in green in the horizontal lines plotted underneath the curves. b
Time course for the performance-dependent contrast in the inferior tem-
poral gyrus; the figure can be read similarly as in panel a. From panels a
and b, it can be seen that the orbitofrontal gyrus differentiation between
coherent and incoherent stimuli starts earlier than it does in the inferior
temporal gyrus and continues till the end of stimulus presentation
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Fig. 5 a Time courses for the stimulus-dependent contrast (fragmented,
scrambled, and control stimuli) in the orbitofrontal cortex. The cluster is
taken from the performance-dependent contrast; the plot can be read
similarly as in Fig. 4. The blue line signifies trials with fragmented
stimuli, the red line trials with scrambled stimuli, and the green line
control trials. It can be seen that all three time courses strongly resemble
each other and standard errors are highly overlapping. Repeated mea-
surement t-tests (scrambled vs. fragmented and fragmented vs. control)
did not reveal any differentiation significant for more than 40 ms. b Time
courses for the performance-dependent contrast, separating coherent trials
into implicitly coherent and explicitly coherent ones. The cluster is taken
from the contrast, in which unsolved and solved trials were taken togeth-
er. The cyan line signifies implicitly coherent stimuli, the blue line
explicitly coherent stimuli, and the red line incoherent stimuli. It can be
seen that the time courses of implicitly and explicitly coherent stimuli are
very similar and clearly differentiate from the time course of incoherent
stimuli. The latter difference was significant for implicitly coherent
stimuli between 269 and 406 ms, as well as 408 and 500 ms,
after stimulus onset and for explicitly coherent stimuli between
297 and 426 ms
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made shall elicit the same level of OFC activation. (5) OFC
activation must reflect the intuitive perception of coherence
and not explicit object recognition and, therefore, be indepen-
dent of whether a stimulus could be explicitly named or not.
Our study testedwhether those five conditions did in fact hold.
Results confirm the five conditions put up to be in
accordance with the present data and, therefore, adding
to previous findings, speak to the OFC as an early
integrator and, thus, a brain region directly involved in
intuitive coherence judgments. These results, at the
same time, signal a potential path of study toward a
better understanding of the OFC’s specific role in intu-
itive judgments.
Condition 1: Orbitofrontal cortex activation is related
to an intuitive feeling of coherence
In accordance with earlier research on visual coherence judg-
ments (Luu et al., 2010; Volz & von Cramon, 2006), left OFC
activation in the present study was significantly higher for
stimuli judged as coherent than for those judged as incoherent.
This was shown in a contrast calculated over all vertices on
source level, revealing a cluster of 75 adjacent vertices in the
left OFC (see Fig. 3). The other six clusters found for this
contrast were primarily regions known to be related to object
recognition processes. The performance-dependent contrast of
coherent (explicitly as well as implicitly) versus incoherent
stimuli—with contrasted conditions differing solely in partic-
ipants' judgments—suggests that OFC activation is related to
participants' actual perception of coherence.
Condition 2: Orbitofrontal cortex activation biases subsequent
stimulus processing in object recognition areas
The time courses of presentation for coherent stimuli versus
incoherent stimuli revealed a differentiation in the left OFC
cluster at 174 ms after stimulus onset, which lasted for 74 ms
(see Fig. 4a). This is about 50 ms earlier than the beginning of
differentiation in the left inferior temporal/fusiform gyrus (see
Fig. 4b), a result that shows that the findings from Bar and
colleagues (2006) in their object recognition task also apply
for coherence judgments in which complete stimulus infor-
mation has not been given. The fusiform gyrus is a region of
the ventral visual pathway that has been strongly associated
with object recognition (e.g., Bar et al., 2001; Grill-Spector &
Malach, 2004). The finding that differential activation for
coherence perception begins earlier in the OFC than in the
fusiform gyrus therefore conforms to the idea of the OFC
signaling a coarse stimulus representation forward to
domain-specific regions, thereby biasing the judgment toward
coherence.
In addition to the inferior temporal/fusiform gyrus, two
further regions related to object recognition and naming
revealed significant clusters of differential activation over
the mean of stimulus presentation: Differential activation in
the inferior frontal gyrus began at 183 ms—that is, later than
in the OFC and earlier than in the fusiform gyrus. The inferior
frontal gyrus has been related to retrieval of semantic relation-
ships (e.g., Bookheimer, 2002; Martin & Chao, 2001) and
may function as a crucial link between an initial perception of
coherence in the OFC and actual object recognition in the
fusiform gyrus. The middle temporal gyrus showed a differ-
entiation starting at 343 ms—that is, only during the second
significant time phase in the OFC and the inferior frontal
gyrus. Its late involvement is not surprising, considering that
this region is especially related to object naming (e.g., Chao,
Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Whatmough, Chertkow, Murtha, &
Hanratty, 2002), which, logically, is a later step in the object
identification process. The finding that the increase of OFC
activation temporally occurs before activation in all clusters in
the ventral visual pathway (see Table 4 for an overview) is in
accordance with its involvement in the initial perception of
coherence and furthermore suggests that this initial perception
is actually sent onward to areas of visual processing that are
involved in subsequent object recognition.
Note that the given data do not imply that OFC involve-
ment in the perception of coherence is limited to signaling
onward an initial gist representation. In the present study,
differential OFC activation, although beginning early after
stimulus onset, actually lasted until stimulus offset. This later
activity, as well as the alternating and partly overlapping
activity of OFC and object recognition areas, might reflect a
more continuous role in stimulus updating, in addition to the
proposed initial gist processing. Such an updating of stimulus
information on an abstract level is in line with several studies
onOFC functionality (e.g., Gluth, Rieskamp, &Büchel, 2012;
Peters & Büchel, 2010; Rolls & Grabenhorst, 2008). Similar-
ly, Luu et al. (2010) suggested that reentrant processing dy-
namics of the OFC are present in visual coherence judgments.
Further studies, in which more time is given for stimulus
presentation and judgment, are needed in order to investigate
exactly how the OFC, in the long run, interacts with other
regions involved in coherence perception or in the following
steps, like explicit object recognition.
Conditions 3 and 4: Orbitofrontal cortex activation reflects
subjective judgments rather than stimulus characteristics
or task requirements
A possible objection to the view that the OFC is reflecting
subjective coherence judgments may be that OFC activation
could simply be due to stimulus characteristics, rather than to
subjective perception. Even when the stimulus types in the
present study differed only in the arrangement of their frag-
ments, with low-level stimulus information remaining similar,
a difference in processing of the different stimulus types is
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demonstrated by participants’ over-chance discrimination per-
formance between fragmented and scrambled line drawings.
Furthermore, the analysis of reaction times suggested different
processes when presented with fragmented, as compared with
scrambled, line drawings. Not only were participants signifi-
cantly quicker in judging fragmented rather than scrambled
drawings, but also their results demonstrated a significant
interaction between stimulus type and response, which reflects
the tendency of “correct” responses (hits and correct rejec-
tions) being made more quickly than “incorrect” ones (misses
and false alarms). Therefore, the contrast between fragmented
and scrambled stimuli collapsed over all response types to
only compare physical characteristics of the line drawings was
crucial in order to rule out the idea that OFC activation is
reflecting general processing differences due to stimulus char-
acteristics. The stimulus-dependent contrast between
fragmented and scrambled stimuli, however, did not reveal
any significant differentiation within the OFC (see Fig. 5a for
the time courses). This supports the notion of the OFC actually
reflecting subjective coherence, as opposed to physical differ-
ences between stimuli.
Another possible concern may be that OFC activation
simply indicates (stronger) attempts at making a decision,
which increases the likelihood of finally recognizing coher-
ence. To rule out this objection, we compared scrambled and
control stimuli. Scrambled and control stimuli share exactly
the same stimulus characteristics; however, they differ in task
requirement (i.e., making a decision vs. not making a deci-
sion). To disentangle activation reflecting the attempt to make
a decision (other than the feeling of coherence or incoherence)
and compare it with the lack of this attempt, scrambled stimuli
were collapsed over all responses. No significant differentia-
tion between scrambled and control stimuli was found in the
OFC (see Fig. 5a). We therefore conclude that OFC activation
in the present study reflects the subjective perception of co-
herence, independently of physical stimulus characteristics
and task requirements.
Condition 5: Orbitofrontal cortex activation reflects
an intuitive feeling rather than explicit recognition
A further crucial point that might speak against OFC activa-
tion as reflecting the intuitive feeling of coherence would be
its dependency on an explicit recognition of the stimuli pre-
sented. However, no significant difference could be found in
OFC activation between implicitly coherent stimuli, where no
explicit recognition had taken place yet, and explicitly coher-
ent stimuli, where a name could be given for the object
(supposedly) displayed in the line drawing (see Fig. 5b). Also,
taking only implicitly coherent stimuli into account. there was
still a significant differentiation of activation in the found OFC
cluster. That is, the increase of OFC activation in collapsed
coherent, in contrast to incoherent, stimuli was not dependent
on explicit object recognition but could be found to a similar
degree in response to all stimuli in which a subjective feeling
of coherence was elicited (i.e., both implicitly and explicitly
coherent stimuli). These observations indicate that OFC acti-
vation is involved in processes that convey an unspecific
feeling about an object without necessarily triggering explicit
recognition. Therefore, the OFC may indeed be crucial to
early information accumulation toward an initial feeling of
coherence that Bowers and colleagues (1990) suggested to
take place in the guiding stage of intuitive judgments. This
initial account of the stimulus may then, probably in interac-
tion with further regions, be processed toward a more explicit
representation.
The orbitofrontal cortex is a structure privileged for intuitive
processing
The present results, suggesting as they do the essential role of
the OFC in intuitive processing, fit very well into the overall
understanding that we have at present on this brain structure.
The OFC has an unusually high number of anatomical, as well
as functional, connections to many different brain areas. It
receives information from all sensory modalities (for an
overview, see Price, 2006b), which may enable it to function
as a global integrator. It has been suggested, though, that the
OFC processes sensory information in an abstract way, inde-
pendently of low-level stimulus characteristics (e.g., O'Doher-
ty & Dolan, 2006). Such coarse and abstract representations
may, in fact, be exactly those that create a feeling of coherence
that cannot be further explained and, in this sense, may actu-
ally establish the basis of intuitive processing.
More than that, the OFC has been shown to have strong
interconnections with subcortical structures responsible for
emotional behavior and memory functions (i.e., the amygdala,
the entorhinal cortex, and the hippocampus), as well as vis-
ceral and motor control (i.e., the hypothalamus, the brainstem,
and the striatum; Price, 2006b). The former may make an
integration of experience and current stimulus information
possible, an integration that is necessary for extracting the
overall gist of a percept. The latter may enable the triggering
of quick behavioral outcomes, with rapidity as a main attribute
of intuitive decision making. In sum, all of these characteris-
tics make the OFC a brain structure privileged to play a core
role in intuitive processing and in creating an abstract percept
that, on a subjective level, leads to an initial feeling of coher-
ence and triggers quick action.
Conclusion and outlook
The present study endeavored to clarify the role of the OFC in
the intuitive perception of coherence. Results suggest that
(left) OFC activation in coherence judgments is linked to an
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initial feeling of coherence that guides subsequent decision
and action. Alternative interpretations of OFC activation,
reflecting differences in physical stimulus characteristics, task
requirements, or explicit object recognition, were ruled out.
Such results line up with the proposed neural model of OFC
activation as providing an initial coarse representation of the
information given. On a subjective level, this coarse represen-
tation is thought to be expressed via an initial feeling of
coherence.
Future research will have to clarify to what extent the
proposed model can be generalized over different domains
of coherence judgments (e.g., different sensory domains, se-
mantic judgments). Furthermore, it will be interesting to see
whether and how the OFC is integrated in a broader network
to enable the representation of an initial feeling of coherence
and what specific role it plays in this network. Also, its
involvement in an individual’s proceeding from an initial
feeling to an explicit understanding will have to be investigat-
ed. Furthermore, since the OFC is a highly heterogeneous
structure that includes many subregions (cf. Price, 2006a), it
will be necessary to differentiate between those in terms of
their involvement in intuitive coherence perception by using
methods with a higher spatial resolution than MEG. On the
basis of the present data, we suggest that the OFC is a structure
that cannot be ignored in research that focuses on a neural
understanding of intuitive processing and, more specifically,
that the proposed neural model may prove a useful starting
point for future research in this field.
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